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VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS
[The heading means literally "The Nine
Variations," but as Sun Tzu does not appear to
enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already
told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from
the ordinary course are practically innumerable,
we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who
says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large
number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought
to very our tactics to the utmost degree.... I do
not know what Ts`ao Kung makes these Nine
Variations out to be, but it has been suggested
that they are connected with the Nine Situations"
- of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by
Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to
suppose that something has been lost--a
supposition to which the unusual shortness of the
chapter lends some weight.]
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general
receives his commands from the sovereign, collects
his army and concentrates his forces.
[Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is
certainly more in place. It may have been
interpolated here merely in order to supply a
beginning to the chapter.]
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp.
In country where high roads intersect, join hands
with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously
isolated positions.
[The last situation is not one of the Nine
Situations as given in the beginning of chap. XI,
but occurs later on (ibid. ss. 43. q.v.).
Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated
across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li
Ch`uan says it is "country in which there are no
springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or
firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and
precipices, without a road by which to advance."]
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to
stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
3. There are roads which must not be
followed,
["Especially those leading through narrow
defiles," says Li Ch`uan, "where an ambush is to
be feared."]
armies which must be not attacked,
[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times
when an army must not be attacked." Ch`en Hao
says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real
defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of
overtaxing your men's strength."]
towns which must be besieged,
[Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts`ao Kung gives an
interesting illustration from his own experience.
When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he
ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in
his path, and pressed on into the heart of the
country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by
the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen
important district cities. Chang Yu says: "No
town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be
held, or if left alone, will not cause any
trouble." Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang,
replied: "The city is small and well-fortified;
even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great
feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make
myself a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth
century, sieges still formed a large proportion of
war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the
importance of marches, countermarches and
maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to
waste men in taking a town when the same
expenditure of soldiers will gain a province." [1]
]
positions which must not be contested, commands of
the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with
their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu
(quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: "Weapons
are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to
virtue, a military commander is the negation of
civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains,
however, that even Imperial wishes must be
subordinated to military necessity.]
4. The general who thoroughly understands
the advantages that accompany variation of tactics
knows how to handle his troops.
5. The general who does not understand
these, may be well acquainted with the
configuration of the country, yet he will not be
able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
[Literally, "get the advantage of the
ground," which means not only securing good
positions, but availing oneself of natural
advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says:
"Every kind of ground is characterized by certain
natural features, and also gives scope for a
certain variability of plan. How it is possible
to turn these natural features to account unless
topographical knowledge is supplemented by
versatility of mind?"]
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in
the art of war of varying his plans, even though
he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will
fail to make the best use of his men.
[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five
obvious and generally advantageous lines of
action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it
must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must
be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition,
it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed,
it must be attempted; and if consistent with
military operations, the ruler's commands must be
obeyed." But there are circumstances which
sometimes forbid a general to use these
advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be
the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it
abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy
has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that
road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but
if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to
fight with desperation, he will refrain from
striking," and so on.]
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans,
considerations of advantage and of disadvantage
will be blended together.
["Whether in an advantageous position or a
disadvantageous one," says Ts`ao Kung, "the
opposite state should be always present to your
mind."]
8. If our expectation of advantage be
tempered in this way, we may succeed in
accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an
advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our
minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility
of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let
this enter as a factor into our calculations."]
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of
difficulties we are always ready to seize an
advantage, we may extricate ourselves from
misfortune.
[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself
from a dangerous position, I must consider not
only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my
own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy.
If in my counsels these two considerations are
properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating
myself.... For instance; if I am surrounded by
the enemy and only think of effecting an escape,
the nervelessness of my policy will incite my
adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far
better to encourage my men to deliver a bold
counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained
to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the
story of Ts`ao Ts`ao, VII. ss. 35, note.]
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting
damage on them;
[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of
inflicting this injury, some of which would only
occur to the Oriental mind:--"Entice away the
enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be
left without counselors. Introduce traitors into
his country, that the government policy may be
rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and
thus sow dissension between the ruler and his
ministers. By means of every artful contrivance,
cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of
his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious
gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and
unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely
women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a
different interpretation of Sun Tzu here: "Get
the enemy into a position where he must suffer
injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]
and make trouble for them,
[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation
indicates that trouble should be make for the
enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we
might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a
large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the
soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These
give us a whip-hand over the enemy.]
and keep them constantly engaged;
[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu
says "prevent the from having any rest."]
hold out specious allurements, and make them rush
to any given point.
[Meng Shih's note contains an excellent
example of the idiomatic use of: "cause them to
forget PIEN (the reasons for acting otherwise than
on their first impulse), and hasten in our
direction."]
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on
the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on
our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on the
fact that we have made our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults which
may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which
leads to destruction;
["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung
analyzes it, which causes a man to fight blindly
and desperately like a mad bull. Such an
opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered
with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush
and slain." Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.:
"In estimating the character of a general, men are
wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage,
forgetting that courage is only one out of many
qualities which a general should possess. The
merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and
he who fights recklessly, without any perception
of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma
Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going
to one's death does not bring about victory."]
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
[Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word
translated here as "cowardice" as being of the man
"whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an
advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to
flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the
closer paraphrase "he who is bent on returning
alive," this is, the man who will never take a
risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to be
achieved in war unless you are willing to take
risks. T`ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage
slip will subsequently bring upon himself real
disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel
Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval
battle with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The
loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while
their opponents were in great force. But Huan
Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him
should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast
to the side of his war-junk, so that he might
escape, if necessary, at a moment's notice. The
natural result was that the fighting spirit of his
soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the
loyalists made an attack from windward with
fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to
be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were
routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for
two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu
tells a somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch`i,
a general of the Chin State who during a battle
with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept
in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case
of defeat to be the first to get across.]
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by
insults;
[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed
in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others
shut himself up behind his walls and refused to
fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary is of a
choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make
constant sallies and break down his walls, then he
will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring
his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey."
This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to
fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's
pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.]
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to
shame;
[This need not be taken to mean that a sense
of honor is really a defect in a general. What
Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated
sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the
thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium,
however undeserved. Mei Yao- ch`en truly
observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The
seek after glory should be careless of public
opinion."]
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which
exposes him to worry and trouble.
[Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the
general is to be careless of the welfare of his
troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger
of sacrificing any important military advantage to
the immediate comfort of his men. This is a
shortsighted policy, because in the long run the
troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at
best, the prolongation of the war, which will be
the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will
often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered
city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment,
contrary to his military instincts. It is now
generally admitted that our repeated efforts to
relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so
many strategical blunders which defeated their own
purpose. And in the end, relief came through the
very man who started out with the distinct resolve
no longer to subordinate the interests of the
whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old
soldier of one of our generals who failed most
conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember,
to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he
but known it, he was only condemning him out of
Sun Tzu's mouth.]
13. These are the five besetting sins of a
general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its
leader slain, the cause will surely be found among
these five dangerous faults. Let them be a
subject of meditation.
[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
---------------------------------------
IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
[The contents of this interesting chapter are
better indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.]
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the
question of encamping the army, and observing
signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains,
and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.
[The idea is, not to linger among barren
uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water
and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: "Abide not in
natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys."
Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu
Ch`iang was a robber captain in the time of the
Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his
gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the hills,
Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but
seized all the favorable positions commanding
supplies of water and forage. Ch`iang was soon in
such a desperate plight for want of provisions
that he was forced to make a total surrender. He
did not know the advantage of keeping in the
neighborhood of valleys."]
2. Camp in high places,
[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks
elevated above the surrounding country.]
facing the sun.
[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and
Ch`en Hao "facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.
Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much
for mountain warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get
far away from it.
["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after
you," according to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says
Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your
evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY
crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next
sentence, this is almost certainly an
interpolation.]
4. When an invading force crosses a river in
its onward march, do not advance to meet it in
mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army
get across, and then deliver your attack.
[Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won
by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at the Wei River.
Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, fol. 6
verso, we find the battle described as follows:
"The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of
the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men
to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand
and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading half
his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a
time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he
hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was
much elated by this unlooked-for success, and
exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really
a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the
river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to
cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great
volume of water, which swept down and prevented
the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from
getting across. He then turned upon the force
which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung
Chu himself being amongst the slain. The rest of
the army, on the further bank, also scattered and
fled in all directions.]
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should
not go to meet the invader near a river which he
has to cross.
[For fear of preventing his crossing.]
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy,
and facing the sun.
[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these
words in connection with water is very awkward.
Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops
marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored
in the stream itself; in either case it is
essential to be higher than the enemy and facing
the sun." The other commentators are not at all
explicit.]
Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we
must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a
river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices
and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- hou has
remarked that 'in river warfare we must not
advance against the stream,' which is as much as
to say that our fleet must not be anchored below
that of the enemy, for then they would be able to
take advantage of the current and make short work
of us." There is also the danger, noted by other
commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on
the water to be carried down to us.]
So much for river warfare.
7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole
concern should be to get over them quickly,
without any delay.
[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor
quality of the herbage, and last but not least,
because they are low, flat, and exposed to
attack.]
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you
should have water and grass near you, and get your
back to a clump of trees.
[Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less
likely to be treacherous where there are trees,
while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect
the rear.]
So much for operations in salt-marches.
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily
accessible position with rising ground to your
right and on your rear,
[Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army
should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a
hill or tumulus on its right."]
so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie
behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
10. These are the four useful branches of
military knowledge
[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains,
(2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare
Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. 1.]
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four
several sovereigns.
[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei
Yao-ch`en asks, with some plausibility, whether
there is an error in the text as nothing is known
of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors.
The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his
victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU
T`AO it is mentioned that he "fought seventy
battles and pacified the Empire." Ts`ao Kung's
explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the
first to institute the feudal system of vassals
princes, each of whom (to the number of four)
originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch`uan
tells us that the art of war originated under
Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng
Hou.]
11. All armies prefer high ground to low.
["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not
only more agreement and salubrious, but more
convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also
disadvantageous for fighting."]
and sunny places to dark.
12. If you are careful of your men,
[Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and
pasture, where you can turn out your animals to
graze."]
and camp on hard ground, the army will be free
from disease of every kind,
[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate
will prevent the outbreak of illness."]
and this will spell victory.
13. When you come to a hill or a bank,
occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your
right rear. Thus you will at once act for the
benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural
advantages of the ground.
14. When, in consequence of heavy rains
up-country, a river which you wish to ford is
swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until
it subsides.
15. Country in which there are precipitous
cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural
hollows,
[The latter defined as "places enclosed on
every side by steep banks, with pools of water at
the bottom.]
confined places,
[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or
"places surrounded by precipices on three
sides--easy to get into, but hard to get out of."]
tangled thickets,
[Defined as "places covered with such dense
undergrowth that spears cannot be used."]
quagmires
[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with
mud as to be impassable for chariots and
horsemen."]
and crevasses,
[Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow
difficult way between beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's
note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and
intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls."
This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it
clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and
Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole,
the weight of the commentators certainly inclines
to the rendering "defile." But the ordinary
meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or
fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the
Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates
something in the nature of a defile, make me think
that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.]
should be left with all possible speed and not
approached.
16. While we keep away from such places, we
should get the enemy to approach them; while we
face them, we should let the enemy have them on
his rear.
17. If in the neighborhood of your camp
there should be any hilly country, ponds
surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled
with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they
must be carefully routed out and searched; for
these are places where men in ambush or insidious
spies are likely to be lurking.
[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on
our guard against traitors who may lie in close
covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and
overhearing our instructions."]
18. When the enemy is close at hand and
remains quiet, he is relying on the natural
strength of his position.
[Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading
of signs, much of which is so good that it could
almost be included in a modern manual like Gen.
Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."]
19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke
a battle, he is anxious for the other side to
advance.
[Probably because we are in a strong position
from which he wishes to dislodge us. "If he came
close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a
battle, he would seem to despise us, and there
would be less probability of our responding to the
challenge."]
20. If his place of encampment is easy of
access, he is tendering a bait.
21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest
shows that the enemy is advancing.
[Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees
to clear a passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every
man sends out scouts to climb high places and
observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees
of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know
that they are being cut down to clear a passage
for the enemy's march."]
The appearance of a number of screens in the midst
of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make
us suspicious.
[Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao
Kung's, is as follows: "The presence of a number
of screens or sheds in the midst of thick
vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled
and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these
hiding-places in order to make us suspect an
ambush." It appears that these "screens" were
hastily knotted together out of any long grass
which the retreating enemy happened to come
across.]
22. The rising of birds in their flight is
the sign of an ambuscade.
[Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right:
"When birds that are flying along in a straight
line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that
soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."]
Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is
coming.
23. When there is dust rising in a high
column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when
the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it
betokens the approach of infantry.
["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of
course somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust.
The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying
that horses and chariots, being heavier than men,
raise more dust, and also follow one another in
the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would
be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to
Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have
scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust
raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report
it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen.
Baden-Powell: "As you move along, say, in a
hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar
for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust
rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc."
[1] ]
When it branches out in different directions, it
shows that parties have been sent to collect
firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro
signify that the army is encamping.
[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the
defenses for a cantonment, light horse will be
sent out to survey the position and ascertain the
weak and strong points all along its
circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust
and its motion."]
24. Humble words and increased preparations
are signs that the enemy is about to advance.
["As though they stood in great fear of us,"
says Tu Mu. "Their object is to make us
contemptuous and careless, after which they will
attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T`ien
Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by
Ch`i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read:
"T`ien Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the
Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch`i
prisoners and place them in the front rank to
fight against us; that would be the undoing of our
city.' The other side being informed of this
speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those
within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only
lest they should fall into the enemy's hands, were
nerved to defend themselves more obstinately than
ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent back converted
spies who reported these words to the enemy:
"What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig
up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by
inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause
us to become faint-hearted.' Forthwith the
besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the
corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of
Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the
city-walls, wept passionately and were all
impatient to go out and fight, their fury being
increased tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his
soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But
instead of a sword, he himself too a mattock in
his hands, and ordered others to be distributed
amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were
filled up with their wives and concubines. He
then served out all the remaining rations and bade
his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers were
told to keep out of sight, and the walls were
manned with the old and weaker men and with women.
This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy's
camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the
Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also
collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people,
and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it
to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the
town capitulated, he would allow their homes to be
plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i
Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer;
but his army now became increasingly slack and
careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got together a
thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red
silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with
colored stripes, and fastened sharp blades on
their horns and well-greased rushes on their
tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of
the rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of
holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing
them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The
animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into
the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost
confusion and dismay; for their tails acted as
torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their
bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or
wounded any with whom they came into contact. In
the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with
gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on
the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din
arose in the city itself, all those that remained
behind making as much noise as possible by banging
drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until
heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar.
Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder,
hotly pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in
slaying their general Ch`i Chien.... The result
of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some
seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i
State."]
Violent language and driving forward as if to the
attack are signs that he will retreat.
25. When the light chariots come out first
and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign
that the enemy is forming for battle.
26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn
covenant indicate a plot.
[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan
indicates "a treaty confirmed by oaths and
hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other
hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous
pretext."]
27. When there is much running about
[Every man hastening to his proper place
under his own regimental banner.]
and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the
critical moment has come.
28. When some are seen advancing and some
retreating, it is a lure.
29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their
spears, they are faint from want of food.
30. If those who are sent to draw water
begin by drinking themselves, the army is
suffering from thirst.
[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the
condition of a whole army from the behavior of a
single man."]
31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be
gained and makes no effort to secure it, the
soldiers are exhausted.
32. If birds gather on any spot, it is
unoccupied.
[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for
instance, as Ch`en Hao says, the enemy has
secretly abandoned his camp.]
Clamor by night betokens nervousness.
33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the
general's authority is weak. If the banners and
flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If
the officers are angry, it means that the men are
weary.
[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently:
"If all the officers of an army are angry with
their general, it means that they are broken with
fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has
demanded from them.]
34. When an army feeds its horses with grain
and kills its cattle for food,
[In the ordinary course of things, the men
would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on
grass.]
and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots
over the camp- fires, showing that they will not
return to their tents, you may know that they are
determined to fight to the death.
[I may quote here the illustrative passage
from the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71, given in
abbreviated form by the P`EI WEN YUN FU: "The
rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of
Ch`en- ts`ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in
supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out
against him. The latter pressed for hasty
measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his
counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn
out, and began to throw down their weapons of
their own accord. Sung was not advancing to the
attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war
not to pursue desperate men and not to press a
retreating host.' Sung answered: 'That does not
apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded
army, not a retreating host; with disciplined
troops I am falling on a disorganized multitude,
not a band of desperate men.' Thereupon he
advances to the attack unsupported by his
colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being
slain."]
35. The sight of men whispering together in
small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to
disaffection amongst the rank and file.
36. Too frequent rewards signify that the
enemy is at the end of his resources;
[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu
Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and
lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good
temper.]
too many punishments betray a condition of dire
distress.
[Because in such case discipline becomes
relaxed, and unwonted severity is necessary to
keep the men to their duty.]
37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to
take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a
supreme lack of intelligence.
[I follow the interpretation of Ts`ao Kung,
also adopted by Li Ch`uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu.
Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia
Lin, Mei Tao-ch`en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general
who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then
in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This
would connect the sentence with what went before
about rewards and punishments.]
38. When envoys are sent with compliments in
their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes
for a truce.
[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly
relations be sending hostages, it is a sign that
they are anxious for an armistice, either because
their strength is exhausted or for some other
reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw
such an obvious inference.]
39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily
and remain facing ours for a long time without
either joining battle or taking themselves off
again, the situation is one that demands great
vigilance and circumspection.
[Ts`ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may
be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected
flank attack or the laying of an ambush.]
40. If our troops are no more in number than
the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means
that no direct attack can be made.
[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to
say, CHENG tactics and frontal attacks must be
eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.]
What we can do is simply to concentrate all our
available strength, keep a close watch on the
enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the
commentators succeed in squeezing very good sense
out of it. I follow Li Ch`uan, who appears to
offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side
that gets more men will win." Fortunately we have
Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in language
which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are
even, and no favorable opening presents itself,
although we may not be strong enough to deliver a
sustained attack, we can find additional recruits
amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then,
concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch
on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But
we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help
us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3:
"The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be
100,000, but their real value will be not more
than half that figure."]
41. He who exercises no forethought but
makes light of his opponents is sure to be
captured by them.
[Ch`en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says:
"If bees and scorpions carry poison, how much more
will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then,
should not be treated with contempt."]
42. If soldiers are punished before they
have grown attached to you, they will not prove
submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be
practically useless. If, when the soldiers have
become attached to you, punishments are not
enforced, they will still be unless.
43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in
the first instance with humanity, but kept under
control by means of iron discipline.
[Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu:
"His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his
martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu
Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites
culture with a warlike temper; the profession of
arms requires a combination of hardness and
tenderness."]
This is a certain road to victory.
44. If in training soldiers commands are
habitually enforced, the army will be
well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be
bad.
45. If a general shows confidence in his men
but always insists on his orders being obeyed,
[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of
peace to show kindly confidence in his men and
also make his authority respected, so that when
they come to face the enemy, orders may be
executed and discipline maintained, because they
all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzu has
said in ss. 44, however, would lead one rather to
expect something like this: "If a general is
always confident that his orders will be carried
out," etc."]
the gain will be mutual.
[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence
in the men under his command, and the men are
docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain
is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei
Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is
not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be
swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness
are the surest means of sapping the confidence of
an army.]
[1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.
---------------------------------------
X. TERRAIN
[Only about a third of the chapter,
comprising ss. ss. 1-13, deals with "terrain,"
the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI.
The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20,
and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string
of desultory remarks, though not less interesting,
perhaps, on that account.]
1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six
kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground;
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "plentifully provided
with roads and means of communications."]
(2) entangling ground;
[The same commentator says: "Net-like
country, venturing into which you become
entangled."]
(3) temporizing ground;
[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or
"delay."]
(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6)
positions at a great distance from the enemy.
[It is hardly necessary to point out the
faultiness of this classification. A strange lack
of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's
unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-
divisions such as the above.]
2. Ground which can be freely traversed by
both sides is called ACCESSIBLE.
3. With regard to ground of this nature, be
before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny
spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.
[The general meaning of the last phrase is
doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, "not to allow the
enemy to cut your communications." In view of
Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the
communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzu
had done more than skirt the edge of this
important subject here and in I. ss. 10, VII.
ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of
supply may be said to be as vital to the existence
of an army as the heart to the life of a human
being. Just as the duelist who finds his
adversary's point menacing him with certain death,
and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform
to his adversary's movements, and to content
himself with warding off his thrusts, so the
commander whose communications are suddenly
threatened finds himself in a false position, and
he will be fortunate if he has not to change all
his plans, to split up his force into more or less
isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior
numbers on ground which he has not had time to
prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary
failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of
his whole army." [2]
Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard
to re-occupy is called ENTANGLING.
5. From a position of this sort, if the
enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and
defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your
coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return
being impossible, disaster will ensue.
6. When the position is such that neither
side will gain by making the first move, it is
called TEMPORIZING ground.
[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it
inconvenient to move, and the situation remains at
a deadlock."]
7. In a position of this sort, even though
the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,
[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and
pretending to flee." But this is only one of the
lures which might induce us to quit our position.]
it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather
to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn;
then, when part of his army has come out, we may
deliver our attack with advantage.
8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can
occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned
and await the advent of the enemy.
[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the
initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden
and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at
our mercy."]
9. Should the army forestall you in
occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass
is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly
garrisoned.
10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if
you are beforehand with your adversary, you should
occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait
for him to come up.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "The particular advantage
of securing heights and defiles is that your
actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy."
[For the enunciation of the grand principle
alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells the
following anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D.
619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition
against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched
his camp as usual, and it had already been
completely fortified by wall and ditch, when
suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift
its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly
displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly
against the extra fatigue which it would entail on
the men. P`ei Hsing- chien, however, paid no heed
to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as
quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific
storm came on, which flooded their former place of
encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The
recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight,
and owned that they had been in the wrong. 'How
did you know what was going to happen?' they
asked. P`ei Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time
forward be content to obey orders without asking
unnecessary questions.' From this it may be seen,"
Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places
are advantageous not only for fighting, but also
because they are immune from disastrous floods."]
11. If the enemy has occupied them before
you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to
entice him away.
[The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign
in 621 A.D. against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te,
King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch`ung, Prince of
Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao,
in spike of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his
attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was
defeated and taken prisoner. See CHIU T`ANG, ch.
2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]
12. If you are situated at a great distance
from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies
is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,
[The point is that we must not think of
undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end
of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be exhausted
and our adversary fresh and keen."]
and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the principles connected
with Earth.
[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to
ground." See, however, I. ss. 8.]
The general who has attained a responsible post
must be careful to study them.
14. Now an army is exposed to six several
calamities, not arising from natural causes, but
from faults for which the general is responsible.
These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3)
collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout.
15. Other conditions being equal, if one
force is hurled against another ten times its
size, the result will be the FLIGHT of the former.
16. When the common soldiers are too strong
and their officers too weak, the result is
INSUBORDINATION.
[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu
[HSIN T`ANG SHU, ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in
821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang
T`ing-ts`ou. But the whole time he was in
command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost
contempt, and openly flouted his authority by
riding about the camp on donkeys, several
thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to
put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some
months had passed, he made an attempt to engage
the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in
every direction. After that, the unfortunate man
committed suicide by cutting his throat.]
When the officers are too strong and the common
soldiers too weak, the result is COLLAPSE.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "The officers are
energetic and want to press on, the common
soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]
17. When the higher officers are angry and
insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give
battle on their own account from a feeling of
resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell
whether or no he is in a position to fight, the
result is RUIN.
[Wang Hsi`s note is: "This means, the
general is angry without cause, and at the same
time does not appreciate the ability of his
subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce
resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon
his head."]
18. When the general is weak and without
authority; when his orders are not clear and
distinct;
[Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the
commander gives his orders with decision, the
soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his
moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers
will not be in two minds about doing their duty."
General Baden- Powell says, italicizing the words:
"The secret of getting successful work out of your
trained men lies in one nutshell--in the clearness
of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also
Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a
military leader is difference; the worst
calamities that befall an army arise from
hesitation."]
when there are no fixes duties assigned to
officers and men,
[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have
any regular routine."]
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard
manner, the result is utter DISORGANIZATION.
19. When a general, unable to estimate the
enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to
engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment
against a powerful one, and neglects to place
picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must
be ROUT.
[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the
sentence and continues: "Whenever there is
fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be
appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in
order to strengthen the resolution of our own men
and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi
ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44,
et al.).]
20. These are six ways of courting defeat,
which must be carefully noted by the general who
has attained a responsible post.
[See supra, ss. 13.]
21. The natural formation of the country is
the soldier's best ally;
[Ch`en Hao says: "The advantages of weather
and season are not equal to those connected with
ground."]
but a power of estimating the adversary, of
controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly
calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,
constitutes the test of a great general.
22. He who knows these things, and in
fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will
win his battles. He who knows them not, nor
practices them, will surely be defeated.
23. If fighting is sure to result in
victory, then you must fight, even though the
ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in
victory, then you must not fight even at the
ruler's bidding.
[Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of
the Ch`in dynasty, who is said to have been the
patron of Chang Liang and to have written the SAN
LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The
responsibility of setting an army in motion must
devolve on the general alone; if advance and
retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant
results will hardly be achieved. Hence the
god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are
content to play a humble part in furthering their
country's cause [lit., kneel down to push the
chariot wheel]." This means that "in matters lying
outside the zenana, the decision of the military
commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote
the saying: "Decrees from the Son of Heaven do
not penetrate the walls of a camp."]
24. The general who advances without
coveting fame and retreats without fearing
disgrace,
[It was Wellington, I think, who said that
the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to
retreat.]
whose only thought is to protect his country and
do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of
the kingdom.
[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the
Chinese "happy warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih,
"even if he had to suffer punishment, would not
regret his conduct."]
25. Regard your soldiers as your children,
and they will follow you into the deepest valleys;
look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they
will stand by you even unto death.
[Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu
draws for us an engaging picture of the famous
general Wu Ch`i, from whose treatise on war I have
frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the
same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest
of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to
ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus
rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every
hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was
suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself
sucked out the virus. The soldier's mother,
hearing this, began wailing and lamenting.
Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry?
Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the
commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison
from his sore.' The woman replied, 'Many years
ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my
husband, who never left him afterwards, and
finally met his death at the hands of the enemy.
And now that he has done the same for my son, he
too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li
Ch`uan mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded
the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The
Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers
are suffering severely from the cold." So he made
a round of the whole army, comforting and
encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as
if they were clothed in garments lined with floss
silk.]
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but
unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted,
but unable to enforce your commands; and
incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then
your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;
they are useless for any practical purpose.
[Li Ching once said that if you could make
your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be
afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of
stern military discipline which occurred in 219
A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of
Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his
army not to molest the inhabitants nor take
anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a
certain officer serving under his banner, who
happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to
appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the
people, in order to wear it over his regulation
helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng
considered that the fact of his being also a
native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to palliate
a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he
ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling
down his face, however, as he did so. This act of
severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and
from that time forth even articles dropped in the
highway were not picked up.]
27. If we know that our own men are in a
condition to attack, but are unaware that the
enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only
halfway towards victory.
[That is, Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this
case is uncertain."]
28. If we know that the enemy is open to
attack, but are unaware that our own men are not
in a condition to attack, we have gone only
halfway towards victory.
[Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]
29. If we know that the enemy is open to
attack, and also know that our men are in a
condition to attack, but are unaware that the
nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable,
we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in
motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken
camp, he is never at a loss.
[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that
he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to
ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move
recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does
move, he makes no mistakes."]
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy
and know yourself, your victory will not stand in
doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may
make your victory complete.
[Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: "Given a
knowledge of three things--the affairs of men, the
seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of
earth--, victory will invariably crown your
battles."]
[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.
[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2.
[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
---------------------------------------
XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes
nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground;
(2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4)
open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways;
(6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8)
hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own
territory, it is dispersive ground.
[So called because the soldiers, being near
to their homes and anxious to see their wives and
children, are likely to seize the opportunity
afforded by a battle and scatter in every
direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu,
"they will lack the valor of desperation, and when
they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."]
3. When he has penetrated into hostile
territory, but to no great distance, it is facile
ground.
[Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the
facility for retreating," and the other
commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu
remarks: "When your army has crossed the border,
you should burn your boats and bridges, in order
to make it clear to everybody that you have no
hankering after home."]
4. Ground the possession of which imports
great advantage to either side, is contentious
ground.
[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be
contended for." Ts`ao Kung says: "ground on which
the few and the weak can defeat the many and the
strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced
by Li Ch`uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this
classification because the possession of it, even
for a few days only, meant holding the entire
invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable
time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For those
who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten,
there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When
Lu Kuang was returning from his triumphant
expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got
as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi,
administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of
the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch`in, plotted
against him and was for barring his way into the
province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch`ang,
counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from
his victories in the west, and his soldiers are
vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the
shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match
for him, and we must therefore try a different
plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the
mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off
from supplies of water, and when his troops are
prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own
terms without moving. Or if you think that the
pass I mention is too far off, we could make a
stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is
nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang
himself would be expended in vain against the
enormous strength of these two positions." Liang
Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was
overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of
movement is open ground.
[There are various interpretations of the
Chinese adjective for this type of ground. Ts`ao
Kung says it means "ground covered with a network
of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested:
"ground on which intercommunication is easy."]
6. Ground which forms the key to three
contiguous states,
[Ts`au Kung defines this as: "Our country
adjoining the enemy's and a third country
conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the
small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on
the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and
on the south by Ch`u.]
so that he who occupies it first has most of the
Empire at his command,
[The belligerent who holds this dominating
position can constrain most of them to become his
allies.]
is a ground of intersecting highways.
7. When an army has penetrated into the
heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of
fortified cities in its rear, it is serious
ground.
[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that
"when an army has reached such a point, its
situation is serious."]
8. Mountain forests,
[Or simply "forests."]
rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that
is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
9. Ground which is reached through narrow
gorges, and from which we can only retire by
tortuous paths, so that a small number of the
enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our
men: this is hemmed in ground.
10. Ground on which we can only be saved
from destruction by fighting without delay, is
desperate ground.
[The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is
very similar to the "hemmed-in ground" except that
here escape is no longer possible: "A lofty
mountain in front, a large river behind, advance
impossible, retreat blocked." Ch`en Hao says: "to
be on 'desperate ground' is like sitting in a
leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu
Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the
plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an
army invading hostile territory without the aid of
local guides: -- it falls into a fatal snare and
is at the enemy's mercy. A ravine on the left, a
mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that
the horses have to be roped together and the
chariots carried in slings, no passage open in
front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to
proceed in single file. Then, before there is
time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the
enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on
the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a
breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of
refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain;
yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a
moment's respite. If we simply maintain our
ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the
moment we make a move, we have to sustain the
enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is
wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is
lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are
jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of
strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow
that a single man defending it can check the onset
of ten thousand; all means of offense in the hands
of the enemy, all points of vantage already
forfeited by ourselves:--in this terrible plight,
even though we had the most valiant soldiers and
the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed
with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek
history may be reminded of the awful close to the
Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the
Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See
Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].]
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight
not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious
ground, attack not.
[But rather let all your energies be bent on
occupying the advantageous position first. So
Ts`ao Kung. Li Ch`uan and others, however,
suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has
already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer
madness to attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when
the King of Wu inquires what should be done in
this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with regard
to contentious ground is that those in possession
have the advantage over the other side. If a
position of this kind is secured first by the
enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by
pretending to flee--show your banners and sound
your drums--make a dash for other places that he
cannot afford to lose--trail brushwood and raise a
dust--confound his ears and eyes--detach a body of
your best troops, and place it secretly in
ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to
the rescue."]
12. On open ground, do not try to block the
enemy's way.
[Because the attempt would be futile, and
would expose the blocking force itself to serious
risks. There are two interpretations available
here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is
indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note: "Draw
closer together"--i.e., see that a portion of your
own army is not cut off.]
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands
with your allies.
[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring
states."]
13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
[On this, Li Ch`uan has the following
delicious note: "When an army penetrates far into
the enemy's country, care must be taken not to
alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow
the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose
march into Ch`in territory was marked by no
violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota
bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us
to blush for the Christian armies that entered
Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of
all. In the present passage, then, I think that
the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but 'do
not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance
the worthy commentator's feelings outran his
judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions.
He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,'
there being no inducement as yet to advance
further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought
to take measures for a protracted resistance by
bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a
close watch on the enemy."]
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
[Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not
encamp.]
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to
stratagem.
[Ts`au Kung says: "Try the effect of some
unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by
saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be
devised which will suit the circumstances, and if
we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the peril
may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on
the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in
among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and
to all appearances entrapped by the dictator
Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to
baffle his foes was remarkably like that which
T`ien Tan had also employed with success exactly
62 years before. [See IX. ss. 24, note.] When
night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to
the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the
terrified animals being then quickly driven along
the mountain side towards the passes which were
beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and
discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from
their position, and Hannibal's army passed safely
through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94;
Livy, XXII. 16 17.]
On desperate ground, fight.
[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight
with all your might, there is a chance of life;
where as death is certain if you cling to your
corner."]
15. Those who were called skillful leaders
of old knew how to drive a wedge between the
enemy's front and rear;
[More literally, "cause the front and rear to
lose touch with each other."]
to prevent co-operation between his large and
small divisions; to hinder the good troops from
rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their
men.
16. When the enemy's men were united, they
managed to keep them in disorder.
17. When it was to their advantage, they
made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped
still.
[Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the
foregoing: "Having succeeded in thus dislocating
the enemy, they would push forward in order to
secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no
advantage to be gained, they would remain where
they were."]
18. If asked how to cope with a great host
of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of
marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by
seizing something which your opponent holds dear;
then he will be amenable to your will."
[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in
mind. Ts`ao Kung thinks it is "some strategical
advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu
says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious
to do, and on the accomplishment of which his
success depends, are: (1) to capture our
favorable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated
land; (3) to guard his own communications." Our
object then must be to thwart his plans in these
three directions and thus render him helpless.
[Cf. III. ss. 3.] By boldly seizing the
initiative in this way, you at once throw the
other side on the defensive.]
19. Rapidity is the essence of war:
[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of
leading principles in warfare," and he adds:
"These are the profoundest truths of military
science, and the chief business of the general."
The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows
the importance attached to speed by two of China's
greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor
of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was
meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had
entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang,
Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general
Ssu-ma I was then military governor of Wan, and
getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at once
set off with an army to anticipate his revolt,
having previously cajoled him by a specious
message of friendly import. Ssu-ma's officers
came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued
himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be
thoroughly investigated before we make a move."
Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled
man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,
while he is still wavering and before he has
thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced
marches, be brought his army under the walls of
Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days. Now
Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko
Liang: "Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news
of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once
inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole
month before any steps can be taken, and by that
time my city will be well fortified. Besides,
Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the
generals that will be sent against us are not
worth troubling about." The next letter, however,
was filled with consternation: "Though only eight
days have passed since I threw off my allegiance,
an army is already at the city-gates. What
miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later,
Hsin- ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his
head. [See CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D.,
Li Ching was sent from K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to
reduce the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had
set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in
Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then
in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his
adversary would venture to come down through the
gorges, and consequently made no preparations.
But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of
time, and was just about to start when the other
generals implored him to postpone his departure
until the river was in a less dangerous state for
navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier,
overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and
he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time
to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we
have got an army together. If we seize the
present moment when the river is in flood, we
shall appear before his capital with startling
suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before
you have time to stop your ears against it. [See
VII. ss. 19, note.] This is the great principle
in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach,
he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry
that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the
full fruits of victory will be ours." All came
about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged
to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people
should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty
of death.]
take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make
your way by unexpected routes, and attack
unguarded spots.
20. The following are the principles to be
observed by an invading force: The further you
penetrate into a country, the greater will be the
solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders
will not prevail against you.
21. Make forays in fertile country in order
to supply your army with food.
[Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch`uan does not
venture on a note here.]
22. Carefully study the well-being of your
men,
[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them,
humor them, give them plenty of food and drink,
and look after them generally."]
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy
and hoard your strength.
[Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in
224 B.C. by the famous general Wang Chien, whose
military genius largely contributed to the success
of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch`u
State, where a universal levy was made to oppose
him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his
troops, he declined all invitations to fight and
remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did
the Ch`u general try to force a battle: day after
day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not
come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to
winning the affection and confidence of his men.
He took care that they should be well fed, sharing
his own meals with them, provided facilities for
bathing, and employed every method of judicious
indulgence to weld them into a loyal and
homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he
told off certain persons to find out how the men
were amusing themselves. The answer was, that
they were contending with one another in putting
the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien
heard that they were engaged in these athletic
pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been
strung up to the required pitch and that they were
now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch`u
army, after repeating their challenge again and
again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The
Ch`in general immediately broke up his camp and
followed them, and in the battle that ensued they
were routed with great slaughter. Shortly
afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by
Ch`in, and the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.]
Keep your army continually on the move,
[In order that the enemy may never know
exactly where you are. It has struck me, however,
that the true reading might be "link your army
together."]
and devise unfathomable plans.
23. Throw your soldiers into positions
whence there is no escape, and they will prefer
death to flight. If they will face death, there
is nothing they may not achieve.
[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu
(ch. 3): "If one man were to run amok with a
sword in the market-place, and everybody else
tried to get our of his way, I should not allow
that this man alone had courage and that all the
rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is,
that a desperado and a man who sets some value on
his life do not meet on even terms."]
Officers and men alike will put forth their
uttermost strength.
[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward
place together, they will surely exert their
united strength to get out of it."]
24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose
the sense of fear. If there is no place of
refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in
hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.
If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled,
the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive;
without waiting to be asked, they will do your
will;
[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]
without restrictions, they will be faithful;
without giving orders, they can be trusted.
26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do
away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death
itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts
and fears," degenerate into cowards and "die many
times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes Huang
Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should be
strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to
inquire by divination into the fortunes of an
army, for fear the soldiers' minds should be
seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he
continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are
discarded, your men will never falter in their
resolution until they die."]
27. If our soldiers are not overburdened
with money, it is not because they have a distaste
for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it
is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage:
"Wealth and long life are things for which all men
have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn
or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own
lives, it is not that they dislike them, but
simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly
insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is
for the general to see that temptations to shirk
fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their
way.]
28. On the day they are ordered out to
battle, your soldiers may weep,
[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is
taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears
alone.]
those sitting up bedewing their garments, and
those lying down letting the tears run down their
cheeks.
[Not because they are afraid, but because, as
Ts`ao Kung says, "all have embraced the firm
resolution to do or die." We may remember that the
heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in
showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the
mournful parting at the I River between Ching K`o
and his friends, when the former was sent to
attempt the life of the King of Ch`in (afterwards
First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all
flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and
uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is
blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is
going--Not to return." [1] ]
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will
display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a
native of the Wu State and contemporary with Sun
Tzu himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang,
better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his
sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he
secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a
banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was
immediately hacked to pieced by the king's
bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero
referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or Ts`ao Mo), performed
the exploit which has made his name famous 166
years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice
defeated by Ch`i, and was just about to conclude a
treaty surrendering a large slice of territory,
when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, the
Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and
held a dagger against his chest. None of the
duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts`ao
Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution,
declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated
because she was a smaller and a weaker state.
Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to
consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his
dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the
terrified assemblage without having so much as
changed color. As was to be expected, the Duke
wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but
his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to
him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the
upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu
the whole of what she had lost in three pitched
battles.]
29. The skillful tactician may be likened to
the SHUAI-JAN. Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that
is found in the Ch`ang mountains.
["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly,"
and the snake in question was doubtless so called
owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through
this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come
to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]
Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by
its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be
attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and
you will be attacked by head and tail both.
30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate
the SHUAI-JAN,
[That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it
possible to make the front and rear of an army
each swiftly responsive to attack on the other,
just as though they were part of a single living
body?"]
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the
men of Yueh are enemies;
[Cf. VI. ss. 21.]
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat
and are caught by a storm, they will come to each
other's assistance just as the left hand helps the
right.
[The meaning is: If two enemies will help
each other in a time of common peril, how much
more should two parts of the same army, bound
together as they are by every tie of interest and
fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a
campaign has been ruined through lack of
cooperation, especially in the case of allied
armies.]
